During the summer of 1709 a
major battle became more and more likely as the two armies closed in on each
other and concentrated their forces in an ever smaller area around the
besieged fortress of Poltava. The smaller area in which the Swedes now
operated in resulted in difficulties to feed their army and this would soon
force some form of decision. At least one Russian general, Menshikov,
believed that the Swedes would be forced to abandon the siege without a
fight. But even though the Swedish morale was greatly affected by the
growing feeling of being surrounded by the enemy in a small area, the rank
and file remained confident that they would defeat the Russians in the event
of a battle. A sentiment which was likely shared by the Swedish king Charles
XII and his right hand field marshal Rehnskiöld.
The Russian army crossed the
Vorskla north of Poltava on 17 June and set up a camp on the same side of
the river as the Swedes. Two diversionary attacks further down the river had
been conducted simultaneously to keep the Swedes away from the main attack.
But despite of this a superior Swedish force of 17-18 regiments led by
Rehnskiöld was nearby when the Russian advance guard of just three regiments
crossed the river. Curiously enough the Swedes made no attempt the stop them
and this has fueled speculation among historians that the Swedes allowed the
Russians to cross because they wanted a major battle. And that the whole
purpose of the siege was nothing but an attempt to lure the Russians in to
battle. In any event the diversionary attacks proved to be very successful
for the Russians because Charles XII was seriously injured in the foot in
one of them. With the king incapacitated and close to death because of the
wound being infected, the Swedes now led by Rehnskiöld remained passive
during the following days when the entire Russian army crossed the river and
then moved further south where they built a fortified camp on 22 June.
On the very same day more
disappointing news for the Swedes arrived. Charles XII had for a very long
time been hoping for reinforcements. Either from the Swedish force left
behind in Poland or from potential allies as the Crimean Tatars. But on that
day messengers reported that the Crimean Tatars were not interested and the
Swedes in Poland had been forced to retreat far away from the main army
because of Polish insurgents. This meant that the Swedes had nothing to gain
by waiting any further for a battle.
The Swedish army responded to
the Russian advance on 22 June by deploying in battle order and inviting the
Russians to fight them on the open field. The Russians decided however to
remain in their fortified camp which the Swedes made no attempt to attack.
After this the Swedes continued to be passive, concerned about their King
who just now began to recover from his injury. The Russians wasted no time
and moved their fortified camp even further to the south on 24 June (only
five kilometres from Poltava). They then proceeded to construct a line of
redoubts extending from that camp to protect the cavalry which was camped on
the open ground. When this was completed the Russians continued to build a
second line of redoubts perpendicular from the first line.
After almost a week of inaction the Swedes finally
decided to attack the Russians on 28 June. Charles XII had not yet fully
recovered and Rehnskiöld was still in command even though the king would
accompany the army in a makeshift litter. The battle plan was devised by
Rehnskiöld and he probably intended to replicate the success of the battle
of Narva nine years earlier by turning the Russian camp into a death trap
where they could neither escape nor take advantage of their greater numbers.
This required the Swedes to position themselves northwest of the camp and
the only way to do this was to march through the Russian line of redoubts.
But it was thought that if the march was carried out at dawn and caught the
Russians by surprise it should not cause that much problems.
However, the Swedes suffered from delays and confusions
when they assembled their army during the night. Thus allowing for the
Russians to learn about their advance in time and deploy their cavalry among
the redoubts. The Swedes had to fight their way through the redoubts,
organised as they were in four infantry columns in the front (led by colonel
Posse and major generals Roos, Stackelberg, and Sparre) and six cavalry
columns in the rear (led by major general Creutz, colonels Horn, Taube,
Dücker and Torstensson and major general Hamilton). The overall commander of
the Infantry was general Lewenhaupt while the cavalry was to be deployed in
two wings led by Creutz and Hamilton. All in all the infantry was about
9,000 men strong and the cavalry was slightly less than that. The opposing
force was more than twice as strong but that did not deter the Swedes since
they were after nine years of war accustomed to succeed against those odds.
Behind them they left about a
1,200 Swedish infantry and dragoons in the siege lines in the front of the
town of Poltava together with a small force of allied Cossacks. Most of the
artillery was left in the Swedish camp at Pushkaryovka
due to the speed needed to affect the Swedish attack plan. The Swedish camp
itself was guarded by a few thousand Swedish cavalry and the bulk of the
allied Cossack forces under hetman Mazepa.
A further few thousand Swedish cavalry were guarding the lower Vorskla
River to guard against a possible Russian thrust from the rear. A small
force of Swedish light cavalry was posted north of Poltava to make a
diversionary attack on some Russian troops known to be near
the village of Yakovetski.
As the Swedes approached the
redoubts, they could see that there were a total of 10 redoubts (which had a
garrison of either 3,000 or 4,700 infantry). But because of the troubled
start of the Swedish advance the redoubts were now also supported by 17
fully deployed dragoon regiments led by Menshikov. And while the infantry
only had a few 3-pounder cannons, each dragoon regiment had an 18-pounder
howitzer which delivered deadly canister fire on the Swedes when they
attacked around 4 am in the morning. In the confused battle the Swedish
infantry columns disintegrated and the army effectively broke into at least
three parts. With two parts trying to bypass the redoubts from each end
while a third part (exclusively infantry) got stuck in the middle in a
misdirected attempt to conquer the redoubts one by one.
Menshikov could sense that he
had victory in his grasp and repeatedly urged the tsar to advance against
the Swedes with his infantry. However, Peter the Great was a much more
cautious commander and he was not willing to leave the safety of his
fortified camp until he got a clearer picture of what was going on. It did
not help that Menshikov sent him captured Swedish colours to show him that
he was winning. Eventually Menshikov had to retreat with his cavalry from
the battle scene. It is unclear if that was because the Russian dragoons
where driven off the battle field and pursued by the Swedish cavalry as the
Swedish sources say or if they were just ordered to retreat as the Russians
would have it.
On the left and the right of
the redoubt line Swedish forces eventually bypassed the redoubts while
conquering one redoubt each in the process. The Swedish infantry that
emerged from the right was subsequently deployed to attack the Russian
fortified camp by Lewenhaupt who believed to have seen a weak point. This
was however counter ordered by an angry Rehnskiöld who wanted to stick to
his battle plan and move the army further north before attacking the
Russians. So instead of attacking the camp the Swedes to the right marched
west to join the Swedish left and then advance north. It then came to
Rehnskiöld’s attention that one third of the infantry led by major general
Roos was missing and was still fighting among the redoubts. So he had to
let the army rest while he sent several staff officers to find Roos and show
him the way back to the main force. Rehnskiöld also sent the two battalions
of Västmanland regiment with some cavalry back south to link up with the
lost battalions.
The missing battalions in the
centre had managed to quickly capture the first redoubt, which was only
partially completed, and with a little more effort they had conquered the
second redoubt too. But the third redoubt proved to be a much tougher
challenge, maybe because it was bigger than the others or because it had
been strengthened with survivors from the conquered redoubts. In any way a
total of six battalions from three different columns had eventually found
themselves making repeated attempts to storm this redoubt and suffer high
casualties in the process. This was an unnecessary fight as the plan was
just to pass through the redoubts as quickly as possible. A reason why this
did not happen could be that the talented colonel Siegroth, who had been
assigned with the task of dealing with the redoubts, was mortally wounded
during these fighting and instead major general Roos took command of the
battalions engaged with the third redoubt (i.e. two battalions of the Dal-regiment,
two battalions of Västerbotten regiment and one battalion each of Jönköping
and Närke-Värmland regiment). Presumably he just got so carried away with
attacking the redoubt that he did not notice that the rest of the army
disappeared.
When Roos realised that the
rest of the army was gone he ordered his battered battalions to retire to
the edge of the Yakovetski woods and where they would be out of range from the Russians. However, by
retreating to the east side of the redoubts rather than the west side he
caused himself the problem that he would have to go through another Russian
gauntlet he if were to re-join the main force. But according to his own
report Roos did not know where the main force had went and when count Bonde
arrived from the main force to show him the way, he told Bonde to wait while
he reorganised his battalions from six to four. Another
testimony from a junior officer serving in the Dal-regiment reveals that the
mortally wounded colonel Siegroth was very annoyed with Roos for waiting too
long and not marching away to join the main force.
At the same time two Russian forces
consisting of five battalions and five dragoon regiments arrived and
proceeded to attack Roos’ battalions from different directions. It is
unclear whether the Russians knew about Roos and intended to destroy his
force or if the purpose was just to relieve the besieged city of Poltava and
that they by chance discovered Roos on their way. In any way the force that
Roos led, which before the battle had been 3,000 men strong, was now so
depleted, demoralised and disorganised that they were not able to put up
much of a fight. According to Roos he formed his battalions in an open
square with their backs to the Yakovetski woods, which prevented the
dragoons from doing much damage, although another source claims that the
fighting started before the square could be completed. In any event the
Swedes fired against orders the first volley which the Russians responded to
by firing a more effective volley. After another exchange of volleys the
Russians launched a bayonet attack causing the Swedish line to break and a
mass flight through the forest. Roos claimed that the severe shortage of
officers made it impossible for him to keep the soldiers in line.
Those who remained with Roos marched
south east to reach a high ground where Charles XIIs head quarter had been
located and which was very close to the area where the Swedish infantry had
been deployed before they marched to battle. Oddly enough Roos thought this
could be the location of the main force. Bonde had not been given time to
tell Roos the actual location before the Russians attacked and he got
separated from Roos during the battle. A possible explanation to why Roos
thought the army could be near the former head quarter is that he may have
seen the Swedish units which bypassed the redoubts from the east side and
then mistakenly concluded that they continued in that direction. That could
also help to understand why he made the fatal decision to retreat from the
redoubts to the east rather than to the west (although that was according to
himself motivated by the fact that Yakovetski woods were closest to him).
But even so it is very strange that Roos could have thought that the army
went through the ordeal of passing the redoubt lines and then just marched
back to the same place where they had started.
Nevertheless, when he reached the high
ground there were no Swedish army to great him, just hostile Cossacks. So he
decided to continue his march south hoping to reach the siege works outside
Poltava and join the small Swedish force that had been left there. During
this march he passed through a monastery where some Swedish civilian
personnel had barricaded themselves against the Russians. Roos had offered
them to join him in his march to Poltava but they refused. Roos then
discovered that the path to the siege works was blocked by Russians so he
and his men had to seek refuge in an abandoned redoubt just north of Poltava
where they were surrounded by a growing number of Russian forces, including
artillery. The Russians offered terms of surrender to Roos who (according to
himself) claimed two hours’ time to consider it, which was granted when the
clock was nine in the morning. Another source says that Roos wanted to wait
until the evening but was only given two hours by the Russians. Anyhow the
Russians shortly afterwards told Roos that the Swedish main army had been
defeated and that Rehnskiöld and many more were captured. If Roos used his
two hours as he wrote in his report is not clear but he most likely did
deliberate with his officers as he said and came to the conclusion that he
ought to surrender. Of the original force of 3,000 men only 400 remained,
who after five hours of fighting now marched into Russian captivity.
The main force of the Swedish army had
waited to long for Roos. Throughout the early morning the cautious tsar
Peter the Great had behaved just the way the Swedes wanted him to. Waiting
inside the presumed safety of his fortified camp and thus giving the Swedes
ample of time of cutting the Russians’ ways of retreat and position them for
a lethal attack. But eventually even the tsar found courage to act against
the passive Swedes whose battle plan obviously had not worked as intended.
When he saw the Swedish army moving south he ordered the Russian army to
march out of the camp and deploy in battle order. This move alarmed the
Swedes who thought the Russians were about to cut off their only way of
retreat so Rehnskiöld ordered an attack which Swedes were not prepared to
carry out. The Cavalry was disorganised and Västmanland regiment had not
returned to its place in the line after its mission to search for Roos. The
much reduced Swedish infantry had to attack without proper support from the
cavalry. The battalions were not synchronised and a gap had opened in the
middle. The Swedes managed to push back the Russian line a little bit but
the line held. With no breakthrough and hopelessly outnumbered the Swedes
were finished. The northern flank was first the break When Östergötland and
Närke-Värmland battalions fled and caused Västmanland regiment which was
marching behind them to flee as well. This left Uppland regiment isolated
and it was nearly annihilated by overwhelming Russian forces. The four Guard
battalions on the southern flank managed to retreat in good order fared
better than average, but even they suffered 52 % casualties. Next to them
were battalions of Kalmar and Skaraborg which were also badly hit, the
latter being annihilated. Together with the casualty rate of 31 % for the
cavalry all this make 28 June 1709 the bloodiest day in Swedish history.
The remnants of a once proud and
formidable army surrendered three days later at Perevolochna. A new army
would be raised to replace it and the war dragged on for an additional
twelve years. But Sweden would never recover from this defeat and was
henceforth forced to fight on the defensive to protect its rapidly shrinking
borders. The battle of Poltava was the turning point of the war and it was
the unlucky fate of major general Roos to be responsible for the turning
point of that battle. He spent the remainder of the war in Russian captivity
and died after the release in Åbo (Turku) on the journey home to Sweden.
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