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Frederick IV of Denmark-Norway, Augustus the Strong of Saxony and Peter
the Great of Russia
The Great Northern War started when a Saxon army launched
a surprise attack against the Swedish city of Riga in February 1700.
Immediately after the news of this attack reached Copenhagen, the Danish
army invaded the Swedish ally Holstein-Gottorp. In August the same year a third
country, Russia, declared war to Sweden. The roll-out of a war against
Sweden on three fronts was the product of years of secret negotiations
between these states. And while Sweden had anticipated a war against
Denmark and viewed Russia as a likely Danish ally, the Saxon participation
came as a big surprise to them. For Sweden this meant that an almost perfect
storm had been created which would eventually bring Sweden’s status as a
great power to an end.
It is common in history writing to point to the fact that
Sweden had too limited resources to be able to maintain its status as a
great power in the long run. And since Sweden’s expansion in the 17th
century had been at the expense of its neighbours Denmark, Russia and Poland
(the latter in a personal union with Saxony since 1697), it was just logical
that these countries would exact its revenge sooner or later. But this is
also an example of writing history by looking through the rear view window
because it pays too little attention to the special circumstances that made
the anti-Swedish coalition come together. The Great Northern War and the
dismemberment of the Swedish dominions was not an earthquake that was just
waiting to happen. It is thus important to take a closer look at each
participant’s reason to go to war.
Denmark
The one state that was really eager to settle the score
with Sweden was Denmark. The only thing that held Denmark back was the fact
that the Swedish military was stronger and that the Danes would need allies
if they were to start a war.
Denmark and Sweden were so called “hereditary enemies”
and they had fought wars against each other since recorded history. Sweden
had always been the underdog in these conflicts from the late 14th
century to the Kalmar War of 1613-15. An integral part of the wars had been
Danish claims to the Swedish throne. The rapid growth of Swedish power in
the 17th century led however to a dramatic reversal of these
roles. In 1643 Denmark experienced that their neighbour would no longer
tolerate Danish provocations, not even when the Swedish army was deeply
involved in the Thirty Years War. To the Danes’ great surprise the Swedish
army turned heel and invaded Jutland from the south and forced Denmark to
cede vast territories. In 1657 Denmark saw an opportunity to take back the
lost territories when the Swedish army was bogged down in Poland. But yet
again the Swedish army immediately turned heel, invaded first Jutland and
then the rest of Denmark, forcing the Danes to cede even more territories.
In the next war (1658-1660) it was Denmark who had to fight for their very
survival as an independent state against Swedish aggression.
Denmark survived however and in the Scanian War 1675-79
they managed together with Brandenburg to destroy much of the great
reputation of the Swedish army. But due to French intervention, Denmark was
denied any territorial gains. Sweden thus still controlled several provinces
that had been ancient Danish core territories. Although, while Denmark would
very much like to retrieve these territories, it was nevertheless a
different issue that was to be the key to future conflict, and that was the
duchy of Holstein-Gottorp.
The Holstein-Gottorp Question
Holstein-Gottorp was strictly speaking not a duchy but it
is called that for the sake of convenience. It was actually a collateral
branch of the Danish royal house that ruled the two Duchies of Schleswig and
Holstein as co-ruler to the Danish king. The latter duchy was a part of the
Holy Roman Empire and both the duke of Holstein-Gottorp and the king of
Denmark was a vassal to the Holy Roman Emperor in their capacity as dukes of
Holstein. Schleswig on the other hand was a part of the kingdom of Denmark
and there the duke of Holstein-Gottorp was not just a co-ruler to the Danish
king but originally also his vassal. The two duchies were partitioned into
ducal, royal and jointly administrated portions.
The lands of the duchy of Holstein-Gottorp were
strategically important and during both Swedish invasions of Jutland in the
middle of the 17th century its duke betrayed the Danish king by
siding with the Swedes in exchange for sovereignty in ducal Schleswig which
was achieved in 1658. The Holstein-Swedish alliance had furthermore been
strengthened by the marriage between the Swedish king Charles X Gustav and
the Holstein princess Hedvig Eleonora in 1654. Their son Charles XI would as
king of Sweden (1660-1697) be very loyal to his Holstein relatives. The
Danes had thus seen Holstein-Gottorp turning from a Danish fief into a
Swedish satellite state which infiltrated Denmark’s vulnerable southern
border. Reversing this was the major goal of Denmark’s foreign policy during
the late 17th century.
At the very beginning of the Scanian War the Danish king
Christian V deposed the duke of Holstein-Gottorp and returned his part of
Schleswig to the Danish crown, although the French intervention in 1679
reversed that too. However, Charles XI felt he had been humiliated by the
unilateral way in which France had made peace on Sweden’s behalf, so he
switched to a Dutch alliance in 1681. The timing of this switch was not good
though since Louis XIV stood at the height of his power at that time.
Sweden’s former enemies, Denmark and Brandenburg quickly replaced Sweden as
France’s northern allies and began to make threatening moves against Sweden.
It was only because of the fact that France kept its eye towards annexing
German territory, and did not want its allies tied up in a northern war,
that Sweden escaped a new war. But in 1684 Denmark invaded Holstein-Gottorp
and reclaimed the Schleswig portions in clear violation of the 1679 peace
treaty. Sweden was powerless to do anything about it and the Dutch alliance
was not worth much when also England was in the French camp and the Emperor
was busy fighting Turks. In this situation Denmark was even bold enough to
lay siege on the free city of Hamburg in 1686.
After years of unsuccessful negotiations concerning the
Holstein-Gottorp question, a political earthquake occurred in England 1688
which changed everything. The Dutch stadtholder William of Orange seized
power in England and managed to build a new great alliance against France
(including former French ally Brandenburg). Charles XI promised to support
the Netherlands with auxiliary troops if they helped him with Holstein-Gottorp.
Suddenly, Denmark was politically isolated and was faced with an ultimatum
to accept the Swedish demands by 20 June 1689 or be attacked by a coalition
of Sweden, Hanover and the Maritime powers (i.e. England and the
Netherlands). On the very last day Denmark accepted the terms of the Altona
treaty and restored the duchy of Holstein-Gottorp. For Charles XI the
humiliation of the 1679 treaty and the following events had now been wiped
clean by the triumph of forcing his enemy into submission without firing a
single shot. For the Danes, this meant that they were now back on square
one. The situation was still unacceptable, but they had to wait for a more
favourable diplomatic situation before they could try to clip the duke’s
wings again.
Even though the duke of Holstein-Gottorp had been granted
sovereignty in his parts of Schleswig in 1658, and had this confirmed in
1679 and 1689, the actual duchies of Schleswig and Holstein were still
intact and with it the old treaties that regulated how they were to be
governed by the two co-rulers. There was thus an in-built contradiction in
this arrangement which enabled different interpretations of how extensive
the duke’s sovereignty actually was. The Danish opinion was that it was very
limited and Christian V had justified his occupations in 1675-79 and 1684-89
by claiming that the duke had broken the terms of the old treaties from the
16th century.
When Frederick IV became duke of Holstein-Gottorp at the
end of 1694, the old conflict began to heat up again. He wanted to put an
end to the ambiguous status of his domains by demanding a final partition of
Schleswig-Holstein and an end to the co-rulership. But what really got the
Danes alarmed were his actions to raise troops and to build new
fortifications in his domains, the latter being done with the help of
Swedish soldiers. The Danes noted that the fortifications were too large for
the tiny Holstein-Gottorp army and that these were obviously intended to be
used by the Swedish army in case of a war. Again the Danish king claimed
that the duke had exceeded his authority while the Duke (and Sweden) claimed
it was within his sovereign rights to build fortifications in his own
territory.
The dissenting views escalated into a full crisis after
the death of Charles XI in April 1697. His son Charles XII was still a minor
and did not assume power until seven months later. In the hope that the new
regime would be less committed to propping up Holstein-Gottorp, Danish
troops entered the duchy in May and destroyed the newly built
fortifications. Sweden did not accept this however and lengthy multilateral
negotiations were initiated to try and find a solution to the crisis. These
were unsuccessful though and Sweden eventually responded with a military
build-up in Germany, which culminated with sending two regiments into
Holstein itself in the autumn of 1699 to rebuild the fortresses.
Furthermore, the alliance between Sweden and Holstein had
been strengthened by the marriage in 1698 between the duke of Holstein and
Charles XII’s older sister, who the same year had brought with her a Swedish
battalion to Holstein as her personal guard. The Danes had tried to woo
Sweden by offering marriage alliances between their royal houses and even
putting a Danish-Swedish-French alliance on the table in exchange for
concessions in the Holstein-Gottorp questions. But Charles XII felt that
both he and his younger sister were too young to marry and his older sister
had already been promised to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp. As time passed
the Swedish position became instead more firmly pro-Holstein and Charles XII
made clear his determination to defend the duke’s rights with military force
if necessary. But the Danes did not waver either and by the end of 1699 a
war looked increasingly likely with the bulk of the Danish army already
deployed in Schleswig-Holstein.
The Great Powers
Denmark’s biggest problem though was that the Altona
treaty of 1689 was still in effect, so not only Sweden but also the Maritime
powers and Hanover were obliged to defend Holstein-Gottorp’s sovereignty in
case Denmark started a war. Denmark had tried to gain favours with the great
powers by offering auxiliary troops and alliances throughout the 1690s and
these attempts had been successful enough that Denmark now enjoyed good
relations with both the Maritime Powers and France. And since a new great
European war over the Spanish succession was likely to come soon, the great
powers were looking for allies so they did not act forcefully against
Denmark in the Holstein-Gottorp crisis. Denmark hoped that the Maritime
powers would not honour the Altona treaty since the Swedish contribution to
them in the recent war of the Augsburg league had been somewhat
disappointing. Sweden had furthermore disappointed them by maintaining a
foreign policy in the 1690s that sought to keep it unaligned and free of
commitments to the great powers.
But as the crisis progressed after May 1697 it was clear
that neither the Maritime powers nor France had any desire for a northern
war between Denmark and Sweden. It was also clear that both camps preferred
Sweden as an ally over Denmark. The Danes tried in vain to convince the
great powers that it was in their best interest to restore the balance of
power in Scandinavia by putting an end to the Swedish dominance. Sweden’s
reluctance to make strong commitments to the Maritime powers would however
keep the Danes hoping that these would remain neutral or even join Denmark
in return for favourable trade agreements when the war started.
Hanover
But even if Sweden and Holstein did not get Anglo-Dutch
aid, Denmark would still need allies if they were to have any real hope of
success. At first glance one might think that the obvious candidates would
be the previous allies in the Scanian War, which were Brandenburg and the
state that was now called Hanover. The latter state was however a part of
the Altona treaty of 1689 and if it was pro-Holstein then it was even more
so now. Danish-Hanoverian relations had deteriorated severely during the
1690s as the elector and king feuded over titles and lands. Danish troops
had even clashed with Hanoverian troops in 1693. With Hanover being a likely
enemy, Denmark instead made alliances with five of Hanover’s smaller
neighbours who promised to attack Hanover if that state broke the peace with
Denmark. These alliances would however not materialise as it was Denmark who
started the hostilities in 1700.
Brandenburg
The elector of Brandenburg on the other hand was at this
time engaged in ambitious goals elsewhere. He was both trying to get support
from the great powers (especially the Emperor) for his desire to declare
himself king in Prussia, as well as succeeding William of Orange as stadtholder of the Netherlands (he was his closest male heir). Because of
this he did not want to antagonise the great powers by being viewed as a
troublemaker. Instead he antagonised Denmark by appearing sympathetic to
the duke of Holstein-Gottorp’s demands during the crisis. Later he even
denied a Saxon auxiliary corps to pass through Brandenburg on its way to
Holstein in late 1699 on the grounds that he did not wish to endanger the
peace in Europe. The elector was at the time under pressure from the Emperor
who had got wind of the emerging anti-Swedish coalition which he saw as a
threat because he feared it might align itself with France. So Imperial
troops had been concentrated in Silesia which prompted Brandenburg to keep a
low profile and not mobilise any of their own troops. The elector did
however at the same time express his willingness to support Denmark in case
they were attacked. And on 6 April 1700, when the war had already been
started by Denmark, he even went further and promised to not support
Denmark’s enemies, and this time allowed for Saxon auxiliary troops to pass
through Brandenburg territory. In exchange he demanded that the Swedish city
of Wismar was to be sold to Brandenburg if the Danes captured it. So even
though Brandenburg was not willing to take part in the anti-Swedish
coalition from the beginning, it was likely that they would have joined not
long after the outbreak of war if the anti-Swedish coalition had been more
successful.
Russia
Perhaps the most obvious Danish ally in a war against
Sweden was Russia since gaining access to the Baltic Sea by retaking former
Russian provinces from Sweden made perfect strategic sense for them. The
Russians had however in the 1670s rejected Danish offers to participate in
the Scanian War, but at that time they had been more concerned over Ukraine
where they struggled for control against Poland and the Ottoman Empire.
Just five days after the death of Charles XI in 1697 a
Danish envoy was sent to Russia to negotiate an offensive alliance against
Sweden. Unfortunately for the Danes, the Russian tsar Peter I had weeks
earlier begun his Grand Embassy to Western Europe and there was no one in
Moscow who could negotiate with the Danish envoy. Since the tsar travelled
incognito and claimed to still be in Moscow, the Danes had great
difficulties in coming in contact with him for well over a year.
Peter I was at this time at war against the Ottoman
Empire and had in 1696 concluded a successful campaign against the Turkish
fortress of Azov and built a naval base there. The Great Turkish War was
however winding down and the Emperor and the Sultan made peace at Karlowitz
in early 1699. The main purpose with Peter I’s Grand Embassy had been to
prevent this peace treaty and even try to expand the Holy League fighting
the Ottoman Empire. The failure to achieve this, and his ambitions not
satisfied with the conquest of Azov, led Peter I to turn his eyes to Sweden.
A rebellion in Moscow forced him to return home earlier
than planned, but on his journey back to Russia he met the Saxon elector and
Polish king Augustus the Strong at Rawa in Poland in the late summer of
1698. Augustus was also a member of the Holy League and equally disappointed
that the war was going to end since he had hoped to conquer Moldavia. The
personal chemistry between them was very good and they spent four days
together. During these days it was most certainly Peter I who approached
Augustus with the suggestion of attacking Sweden instead and the latter who
agreed to this. No formal alliance was however made at this time.
Back in Moscow the tsar began to talk with the Danish
envoy and suggested an alliance between Russia, Denmark and Saxony. The
negotiations would however take some time. In part because of the great
distances between the various capitols, but also because Peter I was a slow
decider who could wait months before he signed the various documents. He was
very anxious that Denmark would confirm alliances and support from other
states such as Saxony and Brandenburg before he committed to a war. The
death of Christian V in August 1699 also resulted in a delay as the new king
Fredrick IV had to confirm the Danish envoy’s authority to negotiate an
alliance. It was thus not until November 1699 that the final agreement was
ratified by the tsar in Moscow. Another complication was that Russia was
still at war with the Ottoman Empire and Peter I did not want to start a new
war until he had resolved the Turkish War, which ended with a truce in July
1700. So Denmark and Saxony had to start the war without knowing exactly
when Russia would join.
Saxony
Saxony was an unlikely enemy to Sweden since they did not
share a border and did not have any rivalling claims. Furthermore, both had
Brandenburg as a neighbour and rival, so in that sense a Swedish-Saxon
alliance was more likely. This changed however when the Saxon elector
Augustus became king of Poland in September 1697 (and shocked protestant
Europe by converting to Catholicism to do so). Poland and Sweden had fought
several wars between 1563 and 1660 and Sweden had conquered Livonia from
Poland as well as annexing Estonia which the Poles had regarded as
rightfully theirs. But Poland had also lost large territories to Russia
after that, and from a Swedish point of view Poland would be a natural ally
against Russia. So the election of Augustus as Polish king was not a source
of immediate concern for Sweden (other than the religious aspect of Martin
Luther’s homeland being ruled by a catholic convert). The weak royal power
in Poland also meant that it was highly unlikely that the King would be able
to deploy Polish troops in a war that was not deemed to be absolutely
necessary by the Polish parliament.
Augustus’ legitimacy as Polish king was also very
questionable since his opponent François Louis, the Prince of Conti, had
actually received more votes in the election. But before the Prince of Conti
left France for his new kingdom, Augustus invaded Poland with a Saxon army
and was crowned by his Polish supporters. This move was strongly supported
by Austria and Russia who did not want Poland to defect from the Holy
League. But the messy succession meant that Augustus had to spend the
following years to pacify his new kingdom with the help of his Saxon army,
as well as continuing the war against the Turks.
In this situation Augustus was very interested in making
alliances that could help to secure his grip on Poland. So when the Danes
approached him he agreed to a treaty in March 1698 in which they promised to
support each other with auxiliary troops in case any of them were attacked.
The immediate effect of the treaty was that Augustus received two Danish
auxiliary corps to be stationed in Saxony and Poland with a combined
strength of 4000 men. Furthermore, the Danes promised to stop any French
fleet from sailing to the Baltic Sea to support to the Prince of Conti’s
claim to the Polish throne. In return for this valuable aid, Augustus
promised in a secret article of the treaty to support Denmark in case the
duke of Holstein-Gottorp did not honour the rights of the Danish king and,
in the event of a war, was supported by a third party.
Augustus was however not a reliable ally, and neither the
Danish treaty in March 1698 nor the oral agreement with the tsar at the Rawa
meeting had really committed him to a war against Sweden. During his long
reign, the impulsive Augustus would become infamous for his machiavellian
habit of not honouring treaties or promises he made. After the March treaty
in 1698 there was very little diplomatic activity for over a year, which
made the Danes doubt that they could expect any help from Augustus. The
event that would be decisive for his participation in an anti-Swedish
coalition was not the previous agreements but instead the employment of the
Livonian nobleman Johann Reinhold Patkul in his service.
When Charles XI wanted to extend his absolute rule to
Livonia, he met strong resistance from the Livonian nobility of which Patkul
was a very vocal representative of. The nobility was however unsuccessful in
retaining its privileges and Patkul was charged with treason and sentenced
to death in 1694. But before that happened he had already fled the country
and he would spend the following years conspiring against Sweden. He came to
Saxony after the Rawa meeting and would then convince Augustus that there
was a deep resentment of the Swedish rule in Livonia. If a Saxon army
invaded that province, Patkul promised that the entire Livonian nobility
would rise into rebellion. He devised an invasion plan which involved a
surprise attack on Riga without a preceding declaration of war, and he
promised that the poor state of the fortifications and the high number of
Livonian officers in the garrison would guarantee success.
Patkul claimed to speak for the Livonian nobility when he
negotiated the terms of a Livonian capitulation to Augustus in August 1699.
Livonia was to be a Polish fief with complete autonomy and freedom of
religion. The nobility’s privileges would not only be restored but also
greatly expanded. In exchange Livonia would be ruled by Augustus and his
descendants even if they did not occupy the Polish throne. The nobility
would also commit to maintaining a 24 000 men strong army. Augustus found
this prospect irresistible and also hoped to increase his power in Poland in
exchange for returning Livonia to the Polish Commonwealth.
Deceiving Sweden
Sweden was not completely unaware of what was happening
around them. Throughout this period they had hoped to gain Augustus as an
ally. His very good relationship with Hanover, with which he in 1697 had
made a similar alliance as the one with Denmark in March 1698, had given the
Swedes expectations that he was a likely ally and it then became a Swedish
mission to recruit him. These negotiations did however not lead anywhere and
in June 1698 the Swedes learned that the Saxon-Danish treaty was much more
significant than what had officially been stated. Sweden was now very
concerned and sent Mauritz Vellingk as their envoy to the court of Augustus
to learn about his true intentions. Augustus used all his charm though and
convinced Vellingk that he was a great friend to Sweden and even denied the
existence of the Danish treaty. Vellingk then began to work on an alliance
between Saxony and Sweden, but again the negotiations just dragged on
without resulting in a treaty, even though Augustus continued to reassure Vellingk about his friendly intentions. While this went on, the Swedish
government got disturbing information from other sources and was in 1699
convinced that Augustus was not a trustworthy character. Augustus eventually
stopped denying the existence of the Danish treaty and thus proved he had
lied, but he still insisted that Sweden had no reason to fear him. By the
end of 1699 though, the Swedish government was thinking that Augustus was
probably friendly after all and an alliance still possible. Vellingk’s
continuous stream of positive reports and the help Saxon diplomats gave
their Swedish colleagues in Moscow made them draw that conclusion.
Sweden had also observed the Danish diplomats’ presence
in Moscow and was worried about the prospect of a Danish-Russian alliance.
It thus became a goal for the Swedish diplomats to sign a treaty with Russia
where Peter I confirmed all the previous peace treaties with Sweden. Peter I
acted very friendly to the Swedish diplomats and proceeded to confirm the
treaties in the autumn of 1699. But when he did so he did not kiss the cross
as was the custom in Russia when treaties were signed. Peter I insisted that
this was not necessary since he had kissed the cross when he had confirmed
the same treaties during Charles XI’s reign. The Swedish delegation had to
accept that explanation and left Moscow in November with a treaty that Peter
I later would claim to be invalid since he had not kissed the cross. When
the Swedes left, their Danish and Saxon colleagues remained in Moscow to
negotiate more lasting treaties.
The Anti-Swedish Coalition
Becomes Reality
After much discussion all the pieces in the new coalition
finally came together in late 1699. Denmark and Saxony had signed a new and
expanded treaty in September 1699 while Russia in its turn signed the
alliances with Denmark and Saxony in November.
The September treaty stated that a lasting peace in the
North could only be achieved when Sweden had returned all territories it had
taken from Denmark, Poland and Russia, although their immediate aim was only
to take back a few of these lost territories. The same treaty outlined that
the war should start not later than February 1700 with a Saxon invasion of
Livonia. Russia would follow by attacking Ingria and Carelia. Denmark would
act forcefully to tie up Swedish forces in Holstein and along the Norwegian
border while the Danish navy would prevent Swedish troops to be transported
to the Baltic provinces and also attack Livonian ports. Furthermore, Denmark
should work to include Brandenburg and the Maritime powers in the alliance
or at least make them promise neutrality. Saxony was in the treaty given the
task to ensure that Russia joined the coalition and also to attack Hanover
and Brandenburg in the back if they chose to attack Denmark.
As proven by the following events, that plan turned out
to be very optimistic. Patkul’s grandiose vision of a great Livonian
rebellion was just a fantasy. The Livonian nobility’s loyalty to Sweden
showed very few cracks when the Saxon army invaded Livonia in February. The
attack itself was not even a surprise since the Swedish governor general in
Livonia, Erik Dahlberg, was suspicious from the very beginning when Saxon
troops arrived near the border in the autumn of 1699. And being Sweden’s top
expert in siege warfare, he took all the necessary precautions. Even a
lesser man than him would not have been surprised since Saxon deserters
revealed in mid-January what their army planned to do.
One man who truly was surprised by the Saxon invasion was Vellingk. When he heard of this he confronted Augustus who denied it
straight to his face and insisted that it was just a false rumour. Vellingk
believed him this time too and, while in detail declaring how silly that
rumour was, he again put forward a proposition of a Swedish-Saxon alliance.
Augustus did not respond to that and instead changed the subject. The next
day Augustus sent an intermediate to inform Vellingk that war had indeed
started between their countries and that he was no longer welcome at his
court.
On the other front Denmark did not succeed in recruiting
any more members to the coalition. The Brandenburg elector was very
unimpressed of how the Saxons conducted their invasion. And much more
disastrous was the fact that rather than helping the coalition or remain
neutral, the Maritime powers chose to honour the Altona treaty. They had
negotiated a treaty with Sweden in January 1700 promising their support to
Holstein-Gottorp in return for Swedish support against France if that
country attacked the Spanish Netherlands or aided the House of Stuart.
Charles XII did not like these terms and it was not until after Denmark
attacked Holstein-Gottorp that he ratified the treaty. But with that
signature the Maritime Powers sent a joint fleet to support a Swedish
invasion of Sealand with the result of Denmark being knocked out of the war
before Russia could join them.
What if?
The events of 1700 were a great
fiasco for the anti-Swedish coalition. But it did start a war that would
eventually lead to Sweden losing its status as a great power since it did
not have the necessary resources to defeat a large coalition on its own.
However, this did not mean that the Great Northern War or a similar conflict
was unavoidable. Denmark benefitted from the fact that both Peter I and
Augustus were very ambitious and unscrupulous men who were not bothered by
starting a war of aggression without anything that resembled a just cause.
And had Sweden made the treaty with the Maritime powers earlier, then
Denmark would likely not have dared to start a war and thus no anti-Swedish
coalition. Augustus on the other hand would probably not have embarked on
this great adventure if he had not met Patkul and been fooled by his dreams,
and Peter I would probably not have agreed to a war with just Denmark as an
ally. Had the Turkish war not ended in 1699, then both Russia and Saxony
would not have been available for a Northern War. Had Sweden been willing to
hold back its Holstein ally and be more conciliatory towards Denmark, then
the Danes might not have proceeded to form an anti-Swedish coalition.
Read also about the
Restoration of the Anti-Swedish coalition |
